Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' by Jon Mandle

Author:Jon Mandle
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2009-03-14T16:00:00+00:00

In radically different circumstances – if governments were not prone to justify infringements on dissent in the name of security, or if the majority in a society were pacifists and the society was in danger from foreign attack – such conscientious refusal would more strongly conflict with the demands of justice. However, given actual circumstances, tolerating such acts may actually serve to increase the justice of a society, all things considered.

Although it is in principle possible to have a case of conscientious refusal that is grounded in a non-political principle (i.e. in a virtue other than justice), Rawls does not give such an example. His examples of conscientious refusal and (of course) of civil disobedience involve political justifications: they depend on “common sense principles of justice that men can require one another to follow and not upon the affirmations of religious faith and love which they cannot demand that everyone accept.” (TJ, 385/337) A non-political defense of conscientious refusal would be far more difficult to make. It would depend on a comparison of the strength of the demands of justice to rival values, and this raises a series of issues that we will discuss in chapters 3 and 4.

Finally, it is clear that there is no mechanical decision procedure that can determine whether particular cases of civil disobedience or conscientious refusal are justified. Nor can any individual or institution be charged with making a final and authoritative determination of the permissibility of any such action. Some might object that this position “invites anarchy by encouraging everyone to decide for himself, and to abandon the public rendering of political principles.” (TJ, 389/341) Rawls's reply is particularly revealing. He concedes that “each person must indeed make his own decision” although we will typically “seek advice and counsel” from others: (TJ, 389/341) But while each person must decide for himself whether the circumstances justify civil disobedience, it does not follow that one is to decide as one pleases…If [a citizen] comes to the conclusion after due consideration that civil disobedience is justified and conducts himself accordingly, he acts conscientiously. And although he may be mistaken, he has not done as he pleased…To the question, who is to decide? the answer is: all are to decide, everyone taking counsel with himself, and with reasonableness, comity, and good fortune, it often works out well enough.

(TJ, 389–90/341–2)

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